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LEIBNIZ - BEYOND THE CALCULUS
HarcJy Grant
York University
Leibn iz ligures in the standard histories of math-
ematics mostly as sha ring , with Newton. the main credit
tortha first significant tcmutaucn of the calcu lus. That is
appropriate in the sens e that there indeed lay his most
vita l and enduring contribution to the SUbject . Butsuch a
focus limits conooerably th e role of mathematics in
Lefbnu ' ow n life and thought. Mathematica l consider-
ations also suggested. crystallized. governed in many
pivotal ways the metaphysica l system that places him
among the West's supreme philosophers. What follows
is an attempt to ou lli ne some features of this broader
picture, to co rrect the sometime fragmentations in our
est imate of his work, to see his mathematical activity as
a whole.
We can not hope to understand him except against
the background of his age . In particular his famous (or
notorious) optimism, though doubtless grounded partly
in personal makeup, had discernible contemporary roots.
His unquestioning fa~h in the existence and supreme
benevolence of the God of Christianity mirrored a climate
in whic h atheism was widely equated less with wckeo-
ness than with mere stupidity. He lived in the heady days
when the homely apparatus of the Royal Society's ~sooty
empiricks" promised to unlock the last secrets of nature,
and when his great rival Newton brought the universe
itseK under the sway of mathematical law. In his time
these advances in physical science, and many of the
great issues of ph ilosophy, remained close enough to
ccmrrcn modes 01 thought that many inquirers , Leibniz
among the m, could address the ir speculations to duch-
esses and kings - who occasionally joined in the game.
It has been called the "Age of Reason" and the ~Age of
Genius," but an equally valid tag would be the "Age of
Confidence." And of course much of the pervasive
euphoria was born 01 the visible power and promise of
mathematics , its application (as by Galileo and Newton)
to physical understanding , the conviction (as in Hobbes
and Spinoza) that its methods could bring unprecedented
improvement in other fields. Not surprising then that
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Leibniz , himsel superbly skilled in mathematics and
steeped (as we sha ll see) in a view of the subject
calculated to encourage bold extrapclations . yielded to
no one in that exuberant age in his hopes both for the
tlJ man understanding of nature and tor the scient ific
amelioration of social ills.
He came relatively late in life to mathematics -
probably the latest "bloomer" among all the subjecl'S
most gifted creators. His formal education in mathemat-
ics was sUght and superficial ; his fundamental work on
the calculus awaited his historic sojourn in Paris (1672-
76), that began when he was already 26 years old . His
eartier training and preoccupations recall the biolog ists '
old notion that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny~ -
that the ind ividual's development retraces its species'
evolutionary course. For like the post-medieval western
mind in general, Leibniz came to an awareness of the
power and beauty of mathematics from an immersion in
the modes and vocabulary of scholasticism,behind which
in tum rested the gigantic figure of Aristotle ;.and Leibniz'
own philosophy retained this imprint to the end. But just
as E. T. Bell declared that the scholastic philosophers
were mathematicians msroues, so Lelbraz in his youth
groped instinctively toward mathematical forms and pro-
cedures that his education had not revealed to him . As
a teenager, he told a correspondent , he wondered
whether, ~since simple terms or concepts are ordered
through the known categories" (Aristotle's word for the
basic organizing concepts 01 all thinking), "one could not
set up categories and ordered series for ccrrelex terms
or truths as well . . . at that time I did not know that
mathematical demonstrations were what I was seek-
ing.'" The triJmphs of his Paris phase "hooked" him
forever on mathemat ics, and his mature writings sing its
praises count less times. Mathematical stud ies. he de-
clared in 1686. have a twof old use and value. -partly as
an exarroe of more rigorous judgment, part ly for the
knowledge of harmony and the idea of beauty.-2 These
idea ls are of course Greek; Le ibniZ tell in love w ith the
spirit 01Hellenism a century ahead of its ' redecc verv -tcr
the German mind by Winckelmann, Less ing and Goethe.
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Greek too was leibniz' conception of the ontological
status, the "reality. R of mathematical concepts and forms .
His unchallengeable place among the subject's "mod-
ern" creators has masked the fact that his own view of it
was profoundly trad itional. Mathematics was for him a
collection 01 timeless. necessary truths . These are
bind ing even on God, who (for example) could not, even
i1 he wished. create a triangle with an angle sum different
from 180 degrees.3 We reach the primary t ruths and
concepts 01 mathematics by observation, by induction,
and by the aid 01 the "natural l ight: that higher intuitive
facuhywhich Aristotle called nousandwhich l eibniz took
over from a European tradition ranging from Augustine to
Descartes. Thus mathematics, on this ancient view,
describes an idealized but objective order, grounded in
our physical experience. In particular its axioms, so far
from being artl itrary, are exceptionally certain tnrtns .
which are in princ iple provable - and Leibniz himsef
undertook on at least fwc occasions to demonstrate lrom
still more basic asscrrotons the Euclidean postulate that
thewhole is greaterthan the pan.4 One must stressaqain
that this whole conception of mathematics was standard
already in antiquity, part of the vast corpus of thought
COdified lor the western heritage by Aristotle and repre-
senting at bottom a kind of enormously intelligent and
deep iy reflective common sense .
It is true thai Leibniz. for his pan. stood near the
beginning of the eventual replacement of this traditional
view 01 mathematics by another. That tremenc:lous
Change, the transition to a modern mathematics far richer
and stranger but increasing ly divorced from experienced
reality and stripped of its claim to absolute truth - non-
Euclidean geometry is the central symbol - is surely the
pivotal watershed in all the subject' s long history, a
revolution much more profound even than the rise of
axiomatic and deductive methods inclassic Greece. The
17th century debate over the status of innnitesimals
formed one eptsooe in that historic passage. lor, as
Leibruz wrote ,these mysterious entities have no counter-
pan in "nature ,"no validati ng presence incur experience.
His own response was in part pragmatic: the fruitful use
01 intirmesfmals in the calculus, he urged, does not
requ ire that these be "real," nor that the philosophical
dilemmas besetting them be resolved . But he grappled
with those dilemmas himself. and ended by seeing
infinitesimals as consistent with the ancient tradition of
mathematical realism. He linked them explicitly with
other rcveeieswhich conte rroorary mathematicianswere
contemplating with diverse degrees 01 uneasiness -
with imaginary numbers , with dimensions beyond the
third. with "powers whose exponents are not ordinary
(i.e., natural)numbers," Al lof these are usefu l "1:0 shonen
our reasoning ,~ and may indeed be essential. But they
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are not - he insisted - merely tctcns. Demonstrably,
tor example,
,/, +F3+'/ ' -'/ - 3 .f6.
so that our use of imag inary numbers ult imately returns
to , is justified by, a Ioundancn in ob jective reali1y
(fundamentum in 'e ): and so with our conceptions of the
infinite and 01 infinitesimals.s Thus even Leibniz' own
groundbreaking wor1<; in the calculus wrought no essen-
Halchange in his tradition-sanctioned vision of the Objec-
tive , Ptatorustcharacter of mathematical ideas ,
And atter all, that same perspective was precisely
the necessary condition for the hopes of leibniz and
others who would extend the methods of mathematics to
other fields. The clarity 01 mathematical concept s
(infinitesimals notwithstanding), and the rigor of math-
ematical demonstrations, had been paradigmatic in
westem thought since Euclid. In Leibniz' mind math-
ematics joined with religious faith in fostering a ccrcep-
tion of metaphysics and ethics as realms of potentially
sure knowledge, of eternal truths underwritten by God
and accessible to human understanding, and therefore
as naturalcandidates lo raJltivation-mo'egeometrico. But
like Thomas Hobbes (Who as a young man he much
admired) Leibniz regretted that the Euclidean method
had not yet been applied with suffici ent zeal and subtlety
outs ide of its home domain - "we have demonstrations
about the circle .but only cc niectures about the soul.~ Al
one time in his life, he te lls us, he tried his own hand at
such metaphysical geometry, in the loftiest of all spiritual
enqu iries, the study of God. "I often actually played the
mathemat ician in theo logy, inc ited by the novelty of the
role: I set up delinit ions and tried to deduce from them
certain elements which were not inferior to those of
Euclid in clarity but far exceeded them in the magnitude
of the ir ecnsecuerces.? In such philosophical adven-
tures, he fe lt, the strict deductive chains cha racteristic 01
geometry are not only possible and appropriate but vital,
lest deep and difficu h truths elude our reasoning. In lact
demonstrative rigor is actually more urgent in metaphys-
ics than in mathematics itsell , where errors are easier to
detect.8
Hence Leibniz ' lifelOng goal of a "universal charac -
teristic," a calculus that wouk:l allow the extension of
logical and matnematca! reasoning to other necs. He
took his cue, and his hopes . from contemporary algebra,
the still excitingly novel syrrbolic manipulations pio-
neered above all by Francois vtete. Without that ex-
ample , wrote leibniZ. he "couk:l hardly have attained" his
own more grandiose schemes,9 Algebra indeed onerec
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the most "beautiful- existing example of the possibilities,
but Leibniz groped toward an -an of combinations-that
would far exceed algebra in power and applicability. He
had the modem insight that algebra is efTllty of content,
that any calcukJsis -nothing but operation through cnar-
acters" and hence can in principle be brought to bear in
very diverse spheres. His -characteristic- would gener·
alize algebra in the sense in which, in geometry, the
concept of sim ilarity genera lizes the concept of equality;
it would be a universal science of lorms rather than
merely a calaJ lus of numbers and magnitudes. And just
as algebra operates on arbit rary letters of the alphabet,
so (Leibniz urged) appropriate combinations and ma-
nipulations of letters can be made to mirror an human
thought . We can even hope to ca lculate , bytaUying such
combinations, 'the number of truths which men are able
to express ,- and hence 'tne size of a work which would
contain all possible human knowledge-10; here again
speaks the authentiCvoice of the Age of Confidence. The
universal charaCieristicwould replace contusion 01 thoug/'t
by clarity , and would allow reasoning as exact in meta-
physics or morality as in mathematics. Hence itpromised
to end forever the clash of differing opinions, the endless
and futile debates and disagreements, that had chrcni-
cally plagUed mankind. Le ibniz had found a seductive
hint of this last benefit in the Aristotelian logic of his
scholastic training . Caught up in philosophical contro-
versy with another scholar, -I proposed the syllogistic
form , which was agreeable to my opponent. We carried
the matterbeyond the twelfth prosyltogism, and, from the
lime we began this , complaints ceased, and we under-
stood each other, to the advantage of both sides:11 But
a tu IIdevelopmentat the arscombinatoriapromised mJch
more, held out the hope that the parties to any dispute
whatever might be able to say merely -let us calculate,-
and all contention would be resolved.
II
It will be obvious that the sine qua non of such
optimism was the certainty that the areas of potential
dispute - metaphysics, polit ics. ethics, theology, Iaw-
are, like mathematics itself, realms of necessary truth,
which need onl y be elucidated to convince. To the study
of such truths Leibniz otten returned . A proposition is
"necessary," by his definit ion, if its denial is (or enta ils) a
COntradiction. But bow . in practice , does one identif y
necessary propcsno ns as sucn? Leibniz' examples are
always statements 01 the subject-copula-predicate form
that dominates Aristote lian logic -statements interpret-
able asCOfTllaring the memberships of setsorthe ranges
of concepts. Aproposition is necessary inLeibniz' sense
if it can be "resolved." by analysis of its subject and
predicate, to an -identity- -that is, a statement with the
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property that of the two sets or concepts involved in the
subjed and predicate respectively. one can be shown to
contain, by definition, the other. (For exampkt, the
statement "a red rose is a rose" is an identity in this
sense.) Leibniz more than once illustrated his technique
01 analyzing necessary propositions with a sentence like
-A duodenary number (i.e., one divisible by 12) is a
~atemary number" (i .e., one divisible by 4) . Interest-
ingly , the passionate cnarroonot algebraic manipula tion
does not prove this withthe trivial eeserveucn that m.12n
imp'ies m-4(3n). but undertakes instead a cumbersome
dissection of the ungainly adjedives that define the
respective sets . A duodenary is (by definition) a 'binary
binary ternary," hence (by definition) a -quaternary ter -
nary ."hence aquatemary, -q. e. d.·12 ttistobenotedthat
-analysis- and (equivalently) -resolution- are in this con-
text technical tenns whose mean ings stem from the
mathematics and philosophy 01 c1assk: Greece : they
descroe the familiar problem-solving strategy that seeks
to reduce theco~x to the simple, the secondary to the
fundamental, the derived to the axiomaticaDy true.
Now propositions which are not necessary are said
by Leibniz to be ~contingent .- They are statements which
can be denied without contradiction, like '1..eibniz at-
tended the University of Leipzg: The 17th century's
SCientific Revolution threw into sharp relief the philo·
sophical issues raised by the ubiquitous presence of
such contingent facts in everyday life. How could these
be reconciled with the deterministic world-view emerging
lromthe new physics? What sense could be made olthe
unnecessitated, of the apparently random and acciden-
tal, what scope remained for human choice and freedom,
in a world bound by mathematically provable -laws- (that
powerful metaphor!), in a dimate 01 thought that soon
would evoke the mechanistic philosophy proclaimed by
La Mettne, the cosmic predestinationism voiced by
Laplace? For his part Leibniz reached a justifICation of
cont ingency that could occur only to a mind profoundly
molded by mathematics. The resolution 01 necessaty
propositions, described above, can always be accom-
plished in a finite nusreer 01 steps . A contingent propo-
sition,by contrast, has the property (according to Leibniz)
that the same sort of analysis doesnot tenninate. Thus
a fun understanding of such proposilions is beyond
human capacity: we can nol perform the infinite se-
quence 01redudions which alone would show that the
concept i.eibniz~ actually includes anendance at the
University of Leipzg . But God, on the other hand , can
take in the whole at this infinite act of analysis in. SO to
say , a single glance. LeibniZ' thought here reflects , no
doubt. the limitless powers ascrtled to God by Christian
tradition: but it echoes contemporary mathematics as
wen. We reca ll that in his time mathematicians were
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increasingly cc rrf crtable with the "colll'lete<f' infinite
that had so spooked the ir Greek predecessors-witness
Newton'S famous declaration that our reasoning is "nO
less sure" in the context of infinite series than when
applied to finite sums, though in the former case our
minds ca n not embrace atl the terms . Human mathema-
t icians, wrote Leibniz in the same spirit , "even have
demonstrations about infinite series" ; how much more
readily, then , are "contingent or infinite truths subject to
the knowledge 01 God:13
But his study of contingent propositions drew on
mathematics in another and much more spectre way . He
found a wonderfully illuminating analogy in a celebrated
piece of ancient geometry. The "Euclidean algorithm," in
Euclid's original conception (Elements, VII, 2), sought
the greatest common measure of two magnitudes by the
repeated subtraction 01 the smaller remaining magnitude
trom the larger, a process guaranteed to terminate if the
magnitudes are commensurable - it, to put the matter in
our terms though not in Euclid's, the ratio of the measures
01 the orig inal magnitudes is a rational .....mber. In the
case of two magnitudeswhich are notcommensurable -
who se ratio is, for us, irrational - the process of recipro-
cal subtraction does not terminate . This contrast became
lo r leibniz the OJide and touchstone of his distinction
between necessary and contingent propositions. The
subject and predicate in a necessary prcccsncn are (he
argued) like commensurable magnitudes, in thai the ir
shared range of reference, revealed by a finitary analy-
sis, is like the magnitUdes' greatest common measure,
computed by the Euclidean algorithm; correspondingly,
contingent propositions resemble surds. leibniz con-
ceded that the analogy is not perfect. for one can calcu-
late the true (irrational) ratio 01 two incommensurable
magnit udes with arbitrarily sma ll error , whereas no such
narrowing of the gap between human and divine under-
stand ing 01 cont ingent truths is possible. Nevertheless
he rejoiced in having discovered through rratnemaucs
the key to a ridd le "WhiCh had me perplexed for a long
time; lor I did not understand how a predicate could be in
a subject and yet the prccosaon would not be a neces-
sary one . But the knowledge of geometry and the
analysis of the infinite lit ttus light in me , so tnat I might
urcerstaro how notions too could be resotvedto infinity :1 4
In suChways - and more te l1 ingly, cemacs. than in
any otner minclof wh ich we have record - mathematica l
ideas conSlantly informed and colored leibniz' enti re
vision of the world . Many other thinkers, of course , have
drawn inspiration from the same source ; Aristotle, for
one, anticipated Leibni2; ' wayof reaching at every turn for
mathematical illustrations of philosophical arguments ,
resort ing naturally to the beSlfounded and most richly
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developed science of his age. But in Leibniz tJ"Ie transfer-
ence of ideas went deeper. For his work on the calOJkJs
put him at the frontier of contertl>Orary advance, and he
brought from mathematics a technical knowledge and
sophiSlication, a grasp of precise and particular detail,
which he applied in philosophy with a specificity that
remains unique . We cannot know - perhaps leibniz
himself couki not have reconstructed - the full course of
this creative borrowing, the complex interplay of math-
ematical examples and their metaphysical analogues in
the final shaping of his thought. Sometimes, as in his
study 01 necessary and contingent propositions, math-
ematical ccnscerarcns might seem merely to have
provided him with a convenient model, that might be
imparted though deeply suggestive. But often, reading
him - and remembering always his image of mathemat-
ics as a ccuectcn of etemal truths, and of concepts
perceived with matchless clarity - one cannot resist the
feeling that he seized on certain 01 those ideas as nol
mere ly suggesting or confirming metaphysical points but
as offering sure signpo sts to the very contours 01 existen-
tial possibility, the very scope and direction 01 God 's
creative design of the world.
It is fascinating to see how lTUchot his metaphysics
can be expounded in such terms. "In the very orig ination
of th ings," he wrote, "a certain Divine mathematics or
metaphysical mechanics is employed," wh ich ensured
the max imum production of all desirable things : we see
the same optimizing principle in the operalion of nature
even now , in (for example) the tact that "When several
heavy bodies are operating against one another, the
resull is that movement which secures the greatest
descent on the whole ."15 In the act 01 creation, said
Leibniz, God acted "like the greatest geometer, who
prefers the best constructions of problems." That is to
say, just as a geometer will seek a prool or construction
that combines maxirrom range and power w ith supreme
economy of argument, so God, in choos ing among the
infinitely many potential orders 01 existence , opled lor the
one which would yield ,he greatest effect- -the maxi-
mum of goodness and happiness - from 'tne simplest
means:16 leibniz lived too far in advance of saddle-
point calcu lus - not to mention the mode m theory 01
games - to make rroCh mathematically of such "mini-
max" cons derato ns, but they remained bas ic to the
opt imist ic tenor 01his philosophy. For onc e, indeed, the
catch-phrase thai has filtered 10 popular perception from
the complex thought of a great mind is wholly accurate :
leibniz really did believe that this is, strictly and abso-
lutely, the best of all possible worlds - whence, 01
course, the brilliant , bitter mockery directed against his
system by Vollaire.
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Furtherdetailsof Leibniz' cosmic visionwere bredor
reinforced by specific features of contemporary analytic
geometry and calculus - their achievements and their
limitations alike. To him the order detectable in the
universe was like the unity imposed on a plane curveby
asingle algebraicexpressionthat describesandgoverns
all its features. He seems to have shared with at least
some01 hisfellow analysts a remarkablybullish sense of
the possibilities of OJrve-fitting; he related that Johann
Huddeclaimed the ability to find an algebraic equivalent
for the profile of any human face, and LeibniZ himsell
agreed that this ispossible.11 Morestrikinglystill, he held
that, given any set of randomly scattered points in a
plane,onecan findacurve "Whose notion isconstantand
uniform,following acertain rule- - meaning,apparently.
the graph of a continuous lunction given everywhereby
a single formula - which not merely passes through all
the given points but does so in the order in whk:h they
were laiddown. Similarty- and the analogyisof course
made fully explicit - God could fashion a harmonious
universe lrom any original chaos of potential existents.
for -noway ofcreating the world can be conceivedwhich
is so disordered that it does not have its own fixed and
determinate order.-18
This mathematically sustained faith in the world's
uhimate rationality and goodness went further still. Un-
deniably. we seem to perceive many irregularities and
inequities in the physical and moral fabric of things.
Likewise (said Leibniz] every curve has points -
singularities. extrema, points 01 inUection -which seem
to stand out as different from the others. But in fact the
seemingly anomalousnatureof such points is shownby
the new catcujus to follow from, to conform to, the
"equation or general nature of the whole- curve, which
thus remains, on a broader perspective, "perfectly or-
dered- after all; and similarly for the seeming imperfec-
tions in the world around us.19 And as in the universeas
a whole, so also in our individual lives. All the seemingly
exceptionaleventsthat befallus, evenour verybirthsand
deaths,are only, as it were, peaks or valleys or cuspson
thetrajectoriesofour immortal souls;theyarenotoutside
theuniformityof nature, theyviolatenogenerallaws.20 In
one especially confident passage LelmiZdeclared that
thewend'soverallperfectionobtainsalsoinallitssmallest
componentparts- evenasthe shortest-descentproperty
01 the cycloid arc which solves the brachistochrone
problemholds between any twopoints, howeverclose.21
As is well known, LeibniZ' philosophy is suffused by
a deep organicism,which saw each of the world's small-
est pans as related to all of the others through constant
-intercourse-androotual influence. It isan ideawhich, as
Joseph Needham urged, ecrcee more vividly the Cht-
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nese sages whom Leibniz studied than the prevailingly
mechanistic outkx>k of contemporary Europe. But it
owed somelhing10 his mathematicstoo, We have seen
his belief that to anyarbitraryset of points can be fitted a
curve "Whose notionis constantandunifomr (errcnasls
here added), LeibniZ scarcely knew - or at any rate
scarcelyconsidered- discontinuousfunctions; and this
prevailing tendencyof his mathematics encouragedhim
to find, everywhere in nature,continuouspassages from
one Slate of affairs to another, The "Law of Continuity"
became one of the most fruitful guiding principles of his
thought. Ellipses, parabolas and hyperbolas, for ex-
ample,seemfrom-ex1emalshape-tobe entirelydifferent
from one another, yet we know that in fact eachof these
passes into the others by gradations so "intimate- as to
bar the insertion of any different kind of curve in the
sequence. "Therefore: said LeibniZ, making one of his
grandest leaps,-I thinkI havegood reasons forbelieving"
that in like manner all the world's endlessly varied spe-
ces 01organiccreatures forma singlecontinuouschain,
-like so many ordinates of the same [continuous~ curve
whose unity does not allow us to place some other
ordinatesbetween two of them becausethat would be a
marie; of disorder and il'11>8r1ection."2Z This ladder of or-
ganic life isof coursethe "GreatChainof Being,- a staple
of the westernintellectual traditionsincethetimeof Plato
(and the subject, 'eng after Leibniz, of one of the most
absorbingandseminal books everwritten on the history
of ideas).23 Leibniz' tendency to findcontinuities every-
where assured him that "When the essentialdetermina-
tions of one being approximate those of another . . . all
the properties 01 the former should also gradually ap-
proximatethoseof the latter - or, aswe shouldsay, any
biological character is a continuous function of position
on the Chain. Certaincreatures with unusual traits,like
the 'zoophytes" that seemto bridgethe plant and animal
kingdoms, maybe viewed as occupying,·so to say,- the
Chain's "regions of inflection orsingularity.-24 The Great
Chain of Being was hoary with antiquity when Leibniz
described it, bu1 never belore or sincewas it conceived
in such specifically mathematical terms,
Every particle of matter, saidLeibniZ.teems with an
infinity of livingcreatures - a notionthat plausiblyowed
much to the wonders discovered in his time. by
Leeuwenhoek andothers,with the first microscopes. At
the very eenem 01 the organic hierarchy are the simple
soul-likesubstancesthatLebniz called"mOnads.· Lebniz
usedmathematical ideaslnwrestlingwiththenotoriously
difficult problem of relaHng these elementary souls to
physical matter, Materiat bodies, he proposed. are
aggregatesof these substancesin precisely theway that
geometrical lines are aggregatesot points. A point, lhat
is to say, is not actually partol a line,10r -a part is always
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of the same natu re as the whole ;- rather, "a line in which
there is a poi nt is a part of a larger line, and similarly "a
soul is not a part 01 man er, but a body in which there is
such a soul issucnapanof maner.-25 In leibniz'organicis1
vision of nature every monad, though absokJtely simple
and withOut pa rts, has nevenheess a I'nJltiplicity 01
relations with things outside itsetf , just as "in a center or
point, in itself perfectly silTflle, are found an infinity of
ang les formed by the lines which meet there.-26
ThiS survey of the mathematical bases of leibniz'
thought could be supplemented by other examples . But
no ca se is here made for the notion that the whole of his
philosophy is so describable . He would have been the
fi rst 10 scorn such a claim as grotesque, for in fact he
insisted repeatedly that much in nature is not 10 be
exp la ined by mathematics.27 The present account has
set aside , as net so palpably tied to mathematics, suc h
fundamental and cnaracrenstc of Leibniz' preoccupa-
t ions as the nature of substance, the relation of -efficient"
and "f inar cau ses , the case for ilTVllOnality, and many
more . I hope only to have shown that the role of
rnathematcs in shaping his philosophy was very consid-
era ble , and thaI it took surprisingly detai led, cruc ial and
SophiSlN:ated forms. This side of the great ph ilosopher
ha s been underappreciated - perhaps above all by
mathematicians. To speak 01 him merely as a co-founder
of the ca lculus is doubtless to set him correctly in the
historyof techncal progress - but at the price of a limited
perspect ive on the whole man and on the splendid
originality and power of his thought .
20
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